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Constructing Viking Link:  
How the Infopower of Cost-benefit  
Analysis as a Calculative Device  
Reinforces the Energopower of  
Transmission Infrastructure    





This paper sheds light on the performativity of economics in the decision-
making process behind Viking Link, a Danish-British interconnector under 
construction. It shows how energopower, that is, the political power inher-
ent to energy infrastructures, is reinforced through the workings of cost-
benefit analysis as prescribed by the Danish Ministry of Finance. In doing 
so, the paper offers a novel approach to the performativity of calculative 
devices, highlighting the role of infopower, a Foucauldian neologism de-
noting the power inherent to information structures. Calculative devices 
are understood as information infrastructures that exert power through the 
work of data formatting. The cost-benefit analysis, as such a calculative de-
vice, limits the potential valuations of Viking Link and hence restricts deci-
sion-making. This has impactful consequences, as the infopower of main-
stream economic thinking makes it possible to disregard relevant aspects of 
Viking Link, like its (lacking) contribution to decarbonization and alterna-
tives to interconnectors as ways of integrating fluctuating renewable en-
ergy. 
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Construire le Viking Link : comment l’Infopower de l’analyse  
coût-bénéfice comme dispositif de calcul renforce l’energopower  
de l’infrastructure de transmission 
Cet article met en lumière la performativité de l’économie dans le processus 
décisionnel derrière Viking Link, un interconnecteur britannico-danois en 
construction. Il montre comment l’energopower, c’est-à-dire le pouvoir poli-
tique inhérent aux infrastructures énergétiques, est renforcé par le fonction-
nement de l’analyse coût-bénéfice prescrite par le ministère danois des fi-
nances. Ce faisant, l’article propose une nouvelle approche de la performa-
tivité des dispositifs de calcul, mettant en évidence le rôle de l’infopower, un 
néologisme foucaldien désignant le pouvoir inhérent aux structures d’in-
formation. Les dispositifs de calcul sont entendus comme des infrastruc-
tures d’information qui exercent un pouvoir grâce au travail de formatage 
des données. L’analyse coût-bénéfice, en tant que tel un dispositif de calcul, 
limite les évaluations potentielles du Viking Link et restreint donc la prise 
de décision. Cela a des conséquences importantes, car l’infopower de la pen-
sée économique traditionnelle permet de ne pas tenir compte des aspects 
pertinents du Viking Link, tels que sa contribution (manquante) à la décar-
bonisation et les alternatives aux interconnecteurs comme moyens d’inté-
grer des énergies renouvelables fluctuantes. 
Mots-clés : analyse coût-bénéfice, instrument de calcul, infrastructure,  
Vikink Link, transmission d’énergie électrique, performativité de l’écono-
mie, transition énergétique 
JEL: L94, Z13, D61, Q48 
 
 
Following the call of the special issue editors to study the “the way 
environmental and energy economics conceive, construct and refer to 
‘facts’” (Erreygers, Gaspard and Missemer, 2019, §2), this article con-
ceptualizes cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as a calculative device produc-
ing facts in political decision-making processes, and presents an energy 
sector case study on the workings and effects of such facts. Based on a 
review of available documentation of the Danish CBA regarding the 
Danish-British interconnector Viking Link, I offer a novel conceptual 
approach to understanding the powerful performative effects that this 
tool from the energy and environmental economic toolbox can have. 
The paper is structured as follows: After introducing the case of the 
interconnector Viking Link and the research question it gives rise to, 
section 1 presents the analytical concepts invoked, namely a concep-
tion of facts (1.1) embedded in the notion of the performativity of eco-
nomics (1.2). Section 2 offers an analysis of the Danish CBA with spe-
cific focus on the welfare-economic foundations and concepts (2.1 and 
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2.2) and the treatment of selected factors like CO2 emissions (2.3), the 
alternative scenarios (2.4) and risk (2.5). Sections 3 concludes. 
Viking Link, a 760-kilometer-long Danish-British interconnector 
under construction is set out to connect the two countries with an elec-
tric transmission capacity of 1.4 gigawatt (GW) by 2023 (NationalGrid 
and Energinet, 2020) at an estimated cost of 1.5 billion EUR for the Dan-
ish share alone (EFKM, 2018). Like other transmission and distribution 
costs of electricity, this infrastructure megaproject (Flyvbjerg, 2017) is 
billed to residential and commercial electricity consumers via electric-
ity grid tariffs, in line with the current Danish revenue cap regulation 
of electricity infrastructure. Furthermore, Viking Link receives support 
from the EU interconnector financing mechanism “Projects of Com-
mon Interest” (European Commission, 2019). The map in Figure 1 
shows Viking Link seen from a Danish perspective. For Energinet, the 
Danish Transmission System Operator (TSO) responsible for the Dan-
ish share of Viking Link, the investment follows recent ones in the Dan-
ish-Dutch Cobra cable and the Danish-German “Krieger’s Flak Com-
bined Grid Solution,” which both went into operation in 2019. 
Figure 1. Existing and Planned Interconnectors to/from Denmark 
 
Source: Energinet and Energistyrelsen (2018), Baltic InteGrid (2019) and ENTSO-E 
(2019) 
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As the Danish TSO Energinet is a publicly owned entity, Viking 
Link was subject to Danish ministerial approval which it received in 
2017 (EFKM, 2017b) and approval by the British regulator, the Office 
of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) in 2015 and 2017. Approvals 
were given based on cost-benefit analyses, described as so-called busi-
ness cases by the involved parties. The business case, describing the 
economic interest in Viking Link (and in other interconnectors between 
mainland Europe and the UK) hinges on a relatively large price gap 
between the UK and continental Europe, giving rise to arbitrage rents, 
that is, gains from trade between the higher priced British and the 
lower priced continental European systems. Ceteris paribus, Viking 
Link increases average prices in Denmark and decreases them in Brit-
ain. As such, the cost-benefit-analysis of Viking Link is strongly tied to 
welfare-economic assumptions as applied in energy and environmen-
tal economics. 
The Danish decision to construct Viking Link has been subject to 
critique (Mathiesen et al., 2018; Hasberg et al., 2018) and has acted as 
an “anchor for societal conflict” (Hasberg, 2021) regarding the future 
development of the energy system. This situation was augmented by 
the fact that numbers were redacted in the Danish documents (Ener-
ginet.dk and Tennet, 2011; Energinet.dk, 2012; Brendstrup, 2013; Ener-
ginet.dk, 2013a; KEBM, 2013) and made public only after approval (En-
erginet, 2017c; 2017b; Energistyrelsen, 2017).1 In contrast to Lind’s 
(1982) advice to use CBA as “a guide for decision-making,” not “as a 
substitute for judgment”, CBA seemingly replaced political and public 
debate in the Danish decision-making process. Although the conflict 
itself is outside the scope of this article, it makes it even more important 
to take a closer look at how the results of the CBA came about: How 
did cost-benefit analysis act as a fact-making calculative device, lead-
ing to the construction of Viking Link? 
1. Analytical Concepts 
1.1 A Fleckian Conception of Facts 
This article is based on a Fleckian understanding of the term fact, as 
formulated in Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (Fleck, 1979 
[1935]). To Fleck, there are three factors involved in the making of a 
fact: “the individual, the [thought] collective, and objective reality (that 
which is to be known)” (1979, 40). A thought collective is a community 
of practice (Lave and Wengers, 1991) that exchanges ideas and devel-
ops a shared thought style of which the individual is “never, or hardly 
 
1 This is in contrast to the situation in the UK where cost-benefit analysis was public 
and consultations were held (Pöyry, 2014; Ofgem, 2015; RenewableUK, 2015; SSE, 
2015). 
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ever, conscious” (Fleck, 1979, 42). Thought styles are characterized by 
delimiting what is considered to be relevant and what is considered to 
be irrelevant.  
Following Fleck, the facts that enter a decision-making process are 
thus a result of: (1) That which is to be known: In this case, modelling 
of future energy flows with and without the interconnector; (2) The 
knower: In this case, the analysts producing the cost benefit analysis); 
(3) The thought collective, restricting what can be known: In this case 
study, the thought collective is represented through the calculative de-
vice of the cost-benefit analysis. A cost-benefit analysis can thus be un-
derstood as an institutionalization of the welfare-economic thought 
collective. Although Ludwik Fleck with his concept of thought collec-
tives emphasizes the role of what Karin Knorr-Cetina’s (1999) calls “ep-
istemic culture” in the construction of facts, Fleck was certainly not a 
pure social constructionist as Barbara Herrnstein Smith (2006) empha-
sizes. Therefore, Fleck’s conceptualization of facts does not conflict 
with, but rather is compatible to, newer socio-material concepts that 
Actor-Network-Theory and Science and Technology Studies have 
given rise to, such as “calculative devices” (Muniesa and Callon, 2005) 
and “infopower” Koopman (2019), to which I turn in the following sec-
tion 1.2. 
1.2 From the Performativity of Economics  
to the Infopower of Calculative Devices  
The performativity thesis2 of economics in general and of markets more 
specifically emerged in Science and Technology Studies and was de-
veloped in the 1990s (Çalışkan and Callon, 2010; Fligstein and Calder, 
2015). It describes that economic theory does not just represent, but 
shapes—that is, performs—reality. Thus, economists and their “calcula-
tive devices” (Callon and Muniesa, 2005)  “make markets” (MacKen-
zie, Muniesa and Siu, 2007).  
Performativity thus entails a form of power to shape the world. To 
emphasize this power of calculative devices, I introduce the concept of 
infopower coined by Colin Koopman (2019) in How We Became Our Data. 
It signifies the power inherent to structures that format information, 
and calculative devices such as cost-benefit analysis can be understood 
as such a structure. Calculative devices format information and feed it 
into public debates, changing their outcomes, and thereby performa-
tively exerting infopower. As a neologism based on the Foucauldian 
term biopower (Foucault, 2008), infopower emphasizes the agency of 
 
2 For discussion of economic performativity in this journal, see Brisset (2011, 2017) 
Maas, Medema and Guidi (2019).  
560 Kirsten Sophie Hasberg | 
Œconomia – Histoire | Épistémologie | Philosophie, 10(3) : 555-578 
both human and non-human actors (Lemke, 2015).3 It provides a way 
of understanding how calculative devices themselves exert power by 
making economists follow calculative rules, even before they have 
made any conscious choices as human actors.  
As calculative devices, economic models and methodologies like 
cost-benefit analysis, here analyzed in its specific version as defined by 
the Danish Ministry of Finance, function as informational infrastruc-
tures to which infopower is inherent. This becomes especially clear 
when considering the de facto status of law of the cost-benefit guide-
lines of the Danish Ministry of Finance. The 
officially recommended method for socioeconomic calculation [in Den-
mark] consequently functions as a de facto regulation. It is not a direct reg-
ulation in terms of a law passed by the parliament, but guidelines issued by 
the Ministry of Finance set the standard for ‘correct socioeconomic calcula-
tion’ … The guidelines are not formally enforced by the state though they 
may be subject to de facto enforcement. (Djørup, 2020, 6) 
The Viking Link interconnector case study in this paper offers an op-
portunity to take a close-up look at how the facts emerging from cost-
benefit analysis exert infopower, and how this interacts with energop-
ower (Boyer, 2019). As infopower, energopower is derived from the 
Foucaldian term biopower and describes how infrastructures, political 
structures and capital structures of incumbent fossil energy players 
create path dependencies and lock-ins that restrict the energy futures 
imaginable (Hasberg, 2019a). 
2. Analysis of the Danish Viking Link CBA 
Fundamentally, cost-benefit-analysis aims at assessing the investment 
costs of a project today compared to future benefits in terms of net pre-
sent value.4 The CBA methodology is derived from microeconomic 
welfare theory (see section 2.1 and 2.2) while the selection of compo-
nents to be included makes up the concrete project appraisal (see sec-
tion 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5). 
Following a Danish perspective, there exist a number of Danish 
guidelines on CBA, published by different ministries. The Ministry of 
Finance is regarded as the authoritative reference guideline (Finans-
ministeriet, 1999) which has been updated since the original Energinet 
 
3 Here, I am not exploring Foucault’s positioning in the history of economic 
thought, see instead Vallois (2015) and Newheiser (2016) for two different inter-
pretations. 
4 Energinet applies the 4% discount rate suggested by the Danish Ministry of Fi-
nance (Finansministeriet, 2018) to Viking Link. “The discount rate recommended 
by the Ministry of Finance has recently been elevated to a formally mandatory sta-
tus” (Djørup, 2020, 6). The rate of discounting is not made subject of further anal-
ysis in this paper, as it is an aspect that is frequently subject to analysis and critique, 
see for example Hasberg (2008). 
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calculations were made (Finansministeriet, 2017). In addition, the Dan-
ish Energy Authority publishes specific guidelines for energy projects 
(Energistyrelsen, 2018d). Energinet has also published a guide to their 
appraisals in connection with the Viking Link debate (Energinet, 
2017a).5 In spite of the goal of CBA to make projects comparable, no 
general consensus exists on how to practice CBA. As De Nooij (2011, 
3100) states, “a project’s approval may depend on which government’s 
department has to approve.” 
The object of analysis is summarized in Figure 2 below, showing a 
summary of the CBA done by Energinet and by the Danish Energy Au-
thority, based on four different electricity market models: BID or “Bet-
ter Investment Decisions”, is the model used by Energinet, whereas 
Ramses and Balmorel are the models used by the Danish Energy Au-
thority, while the last column BF2017 uses updated assumptions. 
Figure 2. Cost Benefit Analysis of Viking Link, Net Present Value, 2017 
 
Translation of Danish terms, from top to bottom: arbitrage rents, consumer surplus, 
producer surplus, investment, taxation surplus, outage time, miscellaneous, net gain. 
Source: Energistyrelsen (2017). 
2.1 Welfare-Economic Foundations and Arbitrage  
The first and second fundamental welfare theorems of microeconomic 
theory are at the root of cost-benefit analysis. They assert that under 
perfect competition, full information, no barriers to entry, no transac-
tion costs and certain assumptions about the preferences of individu-
als, every market equilibrium is Pareto efficient (Pareto, 2014 [1906]), 
that is, there is “no alternative state that would make some people bet-
ter off without making anyone worse off” (EB, 2018). When a Pareto 
improvement makes some actors better off at the expense of others, 
then those who are made better off could potentially compensate the 
 
5 A separate guide on environmental projects was previously published by the 
Ministry of the Environment (Møller et al., 2000), but is no longer updated. 
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losers, although this compensation does not have to take place. This is 
known as the Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle. 
To understand this theory as applied to an interconnector, an addi-
tional concept is needed: that of third degree price discrimination 
(Pigou, 1932). It describes a situation where two separate groups of 
consumers, for example at different geographic locations, are charged 
a different price for the same good. Third degree price discrimination 
leads to Pareto inefficiency, because of the welfare loss caused by lost 
consumption possibilities. It can be alleviated through arbitrage, that 
is, by buying in the higher and selling in the lower priced market 
through an interconnector, as shown in Figure 3. The low-priced coun-
try B on the right-hand side of Figure 3 could represent Denmark in the 
Viking Link case, as Danish wholesale electricity prices are low due to 
high wind shares: On electricity exchanges like the Nordic NordPool 
market, windy hours result in a large supply of electricity at short-term 
marginal costs close to zero, exerting a downward push on the market 
clearing price. In Figure 3, Britain is the importing country A on the left 
panel. Arbitrage will make prices converge until they abide to the ‘law 
of one price’ which, according to welfare economic theory, leads to Pa-
reto optimality. In energy sector terms, this amounts to a ‘copper plate’ 
assumption, that is, full interconnection meaning that no bottlenecks 
inhibit trade. As I will show in section 2.4, this limits the extent to 
which alternatives to cross-country price zone integration, namely 
cross-sectoral integration, is taken into consideration in the analysis of 
whether to go forward with the interconnector project Viking Link or 
not. The welfare-economic assumption of Pareto optimality exerts in-
fopower by implicitly reaching for optimality across borders, not 
across sectors. 
Figure 3. Fundamental Valuation of Interconnectors in  
Welfare Economics 
 
Source: Pöyry (2014). Abbreviations used in the figure: D and S = Demand for and 
supply of electricity. IC = Interconnector. Ap = Price in country A; Bp = price in coun-
try B. 𝛽	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝛿 = welfare gain. VoLL = Value of Lost Load. 
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The scholarly literature on energy infrastructure valuation in the 
field of energy economics confirms the welfare-economic thinking, as-
suming that benefits of interconnection arise from gains of trade (see 
for example Becker et al., 2014; Beato and Vasilakos, 2018). As Dutton 
and Lockwood (2017) write: “There is now a well-established theoreti-
cal literature, mainly economic, that has suggested reasons why greater 
interconnection has proved difficult to achieve in practice, despite the 
clear benefits to aggregate welfare, security of supply and competitive-
ness.” Kemfert et al. (2015) and Schmidt and Lilliestam (2015) pose ex-
ceptions to this literature. Basing their CBA on different assumptions 
Kemfert et al. (2015) conclude that welfare losses are associated with 
excessive transmission capacity investment, not with a lack of transmis-
sion lines. This resonates with Rumpf and Bjørnebye (2019) who show 
that existing interconnectors in Europe are underutilized. In their dis-
section of CBA procedures of interconnector valuation, Schmidt and 
Lilliestam (2015) find that CBA “obscures rather than highlights differ-
ent perspectives and values of stakeholders and biases transmission 
system planning towards a particular set of values” (Schmidt and Lilli-
estam, 2015, 120, my italics). 
CBA thus instills a set of calculative rules that fasten the welfare-
economic assumption of electricity arbitrage resulting in a Pareto im-
provement.  
2.2 Consumer and Producer Surplus 
In Figure 3, the welfare gains of trade are the beta and delta areas 
(green triangles), which are the sum of the (negative) change in con-
sumer surplus, that is, the difference between willingness to pay and 
actual payment, and the (positive) change in producer surplus. As 
noted above, it is not necessary that the winners compensate the losers. 
In short, microeconomic welfare theory is the reason why an intercon-
nected European electricity market is perceived as efficient. 
As a consequence of the Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle, grid 
investments that do not pay off on purely commercial terms can be vi-
able from a so-called welfare-economic point of view, even when this 
is at the loss of consumers. For Denmark as the exporting country B, 
interconnection will result in consumer welfare loss and producer wel-
fare gain. Distributional effects therefore do not play any role in Danish 
CBA and are not specifically addressed in the Danish CBA guidelines 
(Finansministeriet, 2017). The use of CBA thus leads to a depolitization 
of distributional questions. To speak with the words of Ludwik Fleck 
(1979 [1935]), the welfare-economic thought collective speaks through 
the facts that the CBA produces, exerting infopower over what is con-
sidered relevant, that is, what is to be known and what to be ignored 
in the decision-making process. For Danish interconnectors, trade is 
assumed to result in an overall “welfare gain” composed of a “con-
sumer loss” outweighed by a “producer surplus” because of today’s 
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relatively large price differential between Denmark and Britain. The 
Kaldor Hicks compensation criterion ensures that distributional effects 
can be disregarded. 
2.3 CO2-Emmissions 
Upon approval, the Danish Minister of Energy, Climate and Utilities 
announced that Viking Link will “turn green power into the new ba-
con” (Lilleholt, 2017), referring to the historical success of Denmark in 
selling bacon to Britain during the industrial revolution, although the 
modelling of Energinet shows that the profitability of the project 
hinges, among other things, on exporting German coal power to Britain 
via Denmark in the period from 2023-2030 (EFKM, 2017a, Question K), 
because British gas is replaced by German coal power, transited via 
Viking Link (Mathiesen et al., 2018; Hasberg et al., 2018). Importing 
fossil energy from continental Europe increases emissions from conti-
nental fossil generation units, and also their profitability. When fossil 
German power is imported via Viking Link, the British Carbon Price 
Floor6 is by-passed, hence, eroding the British policy measure. Never-
theless, the CO2 effects in neighboring countries due to changed gen-
eration patterns are not part of the Energinet cost-benefit analysis.  
That German coal power benefits from interconnectors between 
mainland Europe to the UK is a result found for Norwegian intercon-
nectors as well (Hope, 2011; Thue, 2013; 2014). Nevertheless, echoing 
the promotion of Viking Link as an enabler of green electricity exports 
as expressed by the minister, Norway is described as acting as a “green 
battery of Europe” (Gullberg, 2013; Gullberg, Ohlhorst and Schreurs, 
2014; Hethey et al., 2015). 
The overall contribution of this interconnector project to a transfor-
mation of the European energy system away from fossil energy re-
mains questionable. Nevertheless, the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) on 
which decision-making is based returned a positive result, resulting in 
the approval of the project. As such, it acts as a calculative device pro-
ducing facts in a Fleckian sense, serving as accepted, unquestioned and 
mobile statements in the decision-making process, rendering questions 
regarding European CO2-emissions irrelevant. As the Minister states, 
CO2 effects are not included because the emissions take place inside 
the European Emissions Trading Scheme ETS. To discard emissions be-
cause they are taking place inside a quota market is common practice 
and recommended by the Danish CBA guidelines (Finansministeriet, 
 
6 The Carbon Price Floor (CPF) is the result of the British “Carbon Price Support” 
(CPS), a CO2 price top-up mechanism with the goal of decarbonizing the UK 
quickly and to make renewables more competitive. Hence, interconnectors are a 
way of importing fossil electricity into the UK that is not subject to the CPF carbon 
tax, circumventing the national carbon price floor (Guo, Newbery and Gissey, 
2019). 
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2017; Energistyrelsen, 2018d). This renders the valuation of the link in-
dependent of its CO2 effects. Thus, the combination of two calculative 
devices, the cost-benefit analysis and the quota market, enables the dis-
appearance of CO2 damage cost in cost-benefit analysis, an effect that 
Çalışkan and Callon (2009) and Madra and Adaman (2014) call “de-
politization through economization.” 
2.4 Considering Alternatives to Interconnection 
CBA compares a Business-As-Usual (BAU) scenario with the project 
scenario. However, when there is significant uncertainty about the 
BAU—which is the case in transformation processes—the comparison 
of only two states becomes a major way in which CBA facilitates igno-
rance. 
A critical omission in the Energinet cost-benefit analysis is that in-
creased sectoral integration between electricity, heating and transport 
in Denmark has not been taken into account. Infrastructural concerns 
can also be solved through market reorganization as an alternative to 
interconnection (Pallesen and Jacobsen, 2018), but “the national [Dan-
ish] guidelines for socioeconomic calculation … act as a potential bar-
rier” (Djørup, 2020, 6) for alternative valuations.  
Models of district heating in Norway show that sectoral integration 
affects the profitability and the flows on interconnectors (Askeland, 
Bozhkova and Sorknæs, 2019; Askeland, Rygg and Sperling, 2020). En-
erginet assumes that only 15% of the district heating demand in 2035 
is covered by large heat pumps and electric boilers (Energinet.dk, 2014; 
2016), cited in (Hvelplund and Djørup, 2020, 75). This is low compared 
to the Smart Energy Scenarios developed by Energinet itself (Ener-
ginet, 2018; 2019). Also, it does not consider the direct production of 
electrofuels for transportation using offshore wind (Ridjan, Mathiesen 
and Connolly, 2016). 
Although Energinet does undertake scenario analyses inhouse of 
sectoral integration, most recently in a report on Power-to-X (Ener-
ginet, 2019) and in the System perspective 2035 scenario (Energinet, 
2018), it is left out of the decision-making process. This type of scenario 
has not been considered in the analysis of Viking Link as it does not fit 
in the cost-benefit analysis approach comparing projects to a BAU sce-
nario. The cost-benefit analysis methodology induces ignorance to-
wards alternatives that are paradigmatically different to the proposed 
project. 
Choosing the factors to be included and excluded in CBA requires 
the analyst to “think broadly” (Costanza, 2006), but the infopower of 
CBA itself acts in the opposite direction: It narrows the considerations 
that are considered to be relevant. The result is that sectoral integration 
as a flexibility measure, although constituting an alternative to inter-
national interconnection, is left out of the decision-making process on 
Viking Link. The calculative device restricts choices by defining 
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alternative scenarios as outside the scope of CBA, which is problematic 
in a situation of system transformation. 
2.5 Risk 
Risk is typically included in CBA via sensitivity analysis. One of the 
fundamental risk elements of megaprojects is uncertainty regarding 
up-front costs and future benefits of the investment, and megaprojects 
are, generally speaking, prone to ex ante risk underestimation.7 Under 
the current revenue cap regulation and TSO regulation, Danish con-
sumers act as risk-bearers, incentivizing risk-taking behavior of Ener-
ginet. (The role of regulation in relation to risk is outside the scope of 
this paper; see instead Hasberg (2020, Chapter 8; and 2019b)). 
The Energinet CBA includes sensitivity analysis through Monte 
Carlo simulation of a range of risk factors, concluding that there is an 
88% probability that Viking Link will return a positive socio-economic 
value; that is, a risk of 12% that the interconnector will result in a socio-
economic loss (Energinet, 2017d). However, since the sensitivity anal-
yses are not mentioned in the summary presented by the Danish En-
ergy Authority (Energistyrelsen, 2017), risk is downplayed in the 
presentation of results. 
In the following, I take a closer look at how two specific risk factors: 
(1) Cannibalization effects arising from other interconnectors (2.5.1), 
and (2) wind power correlation, that is, simultaneous occurrence of 
wind events in the two price zones that the interconnector connects 
(2.5.2). 
2.5.1 Cannibalization Effects 
Cannibalization refers to how a “new interconnector may lead to an 
additional price convergence between the two regions, which would 
in turn reduce the congestion revenues that any pre-existing intercon-
nectors across the two same zones would earn” (Australian Energy 
Regulator, 2018). Cannibalization effects on interconnectors without 
Danish involvement are excluded from the cost-benefit analysis but are 
listed in a separate table that is redacted (Energinet, 2017d, 14). 
Energinet does include cannibalization effects on existing Danish 
interconnectors, but lump them together with arbitrage gains, making 
it impossible to identify the extent of cannibalization (Energinet, 2017c, 
5). The sensitivity analyses include several scenarios for additional in-
terconnection capacity, but the results contradict each other in the two 
available public versions of the business case. Energinet (2017c, 18) 
states that if an additional interconnector is established between Britain 
and Norway, the value of Viking Link is reduced by 336 million DKK; 
 
7 For an exploration of this argument, see Wachs, 1989; Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl, 
2002; van Wee and Tavasszy, 2008; Sovacool and Cooper, 2013. 
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furthermore, a 1.4 GW interconnector between Britain and Germany 
will reduce the value of Viking Link by 443 million DKK. Contrast this 
to  Energinet (2017a, 33), stating that a 2 GW interconnector between 
Britain and Germany will reduce the value of Viking Link by 809 mil-
lion DKK.8 It is not clear why the two estimates differ.  
The lack of specification of the cannibalization effects is in contrast 
to the British analysis (Pöyry, 2014) that has a detailed methodology 
for assessing different cables and their cannibalization effects, model-
ling the “value as the first additional interconnector” and the “value as 
the marginal interconnector.” Also the Norwegian analysis of the mer-
chant interconnector between Norway and Scotland explicitly includes 
cannibalization effects (NorthConnect, 2017). With nine new intercon-
nectors planned between the UK and the European continent, canni-
balization effects seem underestimated in the analysis, implicitly ac-
cepting cannibalization effects on already existing, own lines as a “nec-
essary evil.” Accepting such a loss is typically the case when private 
companies attempt to win market shares as part of a growth strategy 
(Investopedia, 2019). This strategy hence points to Energinet not as a 
natural monopolist, but as a multinational competitor in the European 
market for interconnectors, a point that I elaborate on in Hasberg 
(2020a, Chapter 8).  
2.5.2 Wind and other Renewables in the UK 
As already illustrated in section 2.4 on considering alternatives, system 
transformation is difficult to imagine within the formatting instilled by 
CBA. This section takes a closer look at system transformation as a risk 
to the profitability of the link due to the simultaneity of the incidence 
of wind in Denmark and the UK. 
Renewable energy developments in Britain affect the valuation of 
Viking Link in two ways: through the amount of fluctuating renewable 
energy, and through its timing, that is, its degree of simultaneity with 
Danish fluctuating renewables (mostly wind power). As with the in-
terconnector estimates in section 2.5.1 above, there are inconsistencies 
in the sensitivity analysis of the impact of large shares of wind in Brit-
ain in Energinet (2017a, 32), stating that significantly higher amounts 
of wind and solar power as described in the 2030 National Grid “Gone 
Green” scenario reduce the value of Viking Link by 2.84 billion DKK. 
Compare this to Energinet (2017c, 24), stating that the value of Viking 
Link increases by 544 million DKK if renewables are expanded accord-
ing to the National Grid 2030 “Gone Green” scenario. It seems that the 
increasing shares of fluctuating renewables have been inconsistently 
considered in the Energinet analysis. This might be caused by the ap-
plication of varying estimates of correlation: Energinet (2017b) states 
 
8 The interconnectors in question are probably NeuConnect and NorthConnect. 
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that correlation between Danish and UK wind is 0.42, but it is unclear 
which temporal resolution this correlation refers to.  
Figure 4. Wind Energy Production in the Energinet, National Grid and 
TenneT Control Areas in the Year 2016 in Different Resolutions  
(Right Scale) 
 
Source: Mathiesen et al. (2018). 
 
However, the datasets for modelling the Danish and UK wind power 
profiles and their correlation are not public, hence it is difficult to as-
sess these claims and the cause of the different results of the sensitivity 
analysis in Energinet (2017a) and Energinet (2017c). Figure 4 shows the 
correlation for historical wind data in different resolutions. It shows 
how sensitive the correlation is to the time resolution. If the wind blows 
simultaneously in the UK and Denmark, and the shares of wind in-
crease in the UK, this reduces the economic viability of Viking Link 
because exports to a price area with similar weather patterns cannot be 
used to solve the problem of integrating large amounts of wind power 
in energy systems.  
In sum, both the risk regarding cannibalization (2.5.1) and the risk 
regarding wind simultaneity (2.5.2) pose a risk to the economic viabil-
ity of Viking Link that the CBA does not sufficiently confront just as 
scenarios of systems transformation towards more sectoral integration 
are left unconsidered (2.4). These findings echo those of Reinertsen and 
Asdal (2019) who state that numbers like the ones resulting from cost-
benefit analysis can lead to the acceptance of “uncertainty and encour-
ages risk-taking over precaution and constraint” (2019, 552), “closing 
off possibilities and uncertainties” (567).  
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3. Results: Infopower Reinforces Energopower 
It becomes clear that many choices in cost-benefit analysis are re-
stricted by methodological constraints derived from both microeco-
nomic theory as well as CBA conduct as institutionalized in practice 
guidelines. The CBA methodology, even before active choices are 
made, strongly formats the way the world can be seen, for example, by 
referring to a business as usual scenario and thus exerting infopower 
and limiting the potential outcomes. Superimposing CBA assumptions 
of not valuing CO2 effects and ignoring alternatives because of BAU 
assumptions are two examples of how the results of a CBA might be 
difficult to reconcile with the reality of climate crisis. 
CBA renders the asking of relevant questions, for example regard-
ing CO2 emissions or systems transformation irrelevant as these ele-
ments cannot be considered within the CBA framework. Explicit polit-
ical goals like reaching renewable energy targets do not form the basis 
of decision-making, which is rather governed by the fundamental as-
sumptions of the welfare economic thought collective as represented 
by CBA procedures and its focus on arbitrage gains and changes in 
consumer and prosumer surplus. 
This obscurity is a form of depoliticization (Bues and Gailing, 2016) 
as it removes relevant issues from the policy arena by decoupling rele-
vant issues from calculative regimes (Reinertsen and Asdal, 2019, 553). 
The process of how specific arrangements of calculative devices of 
thought collectives constitute and reinforce forms of energopower ech-
oes Gabrielle Hecht’s notion of “technopolitics,” which is the “strategic 
practice of designing or using technology to constitute, embody, or en-
act political goals” (Hecht, 2009, 15).  
As Timothy Mitchell (2007, 248) emphasizes, instead of just ascer-
taining that the calculative devices of economics are performative, it is 
“useful to consider what kind of world the (mis)representation helps 
to organize.” Thus, the “narrowness of neoclassical economics … 
serves a purpose” (Mitchell, 2007, 244). In other words, the performa-
tive effects must fall on fruitful political ground, as Marion Fourcade 
asserts (2011b, 15) in order to unfold. Ray Galvin (2020, 6) comes to a 
similar conclusion, arguing that economics is performative when it 
serves energopower, as Boyer (2019) terms the incumbent structures of 
the energy sector. 
In the case of Viking Link, the calculative device of CBA reinforces 
the “constitutive power of energy infrastructures” (Bridge, Özkaynak 
and Turhan, 2018), the infopower of the cost-benefit-analysis fastens the 
path once taken, that is, holds the energy system in place by disregard-
ing alternative ways of integrating renewable energy. With the con-
struction of Viking Link, renewable energy is fastened in the same—
both figurative and literal—power structures as fossil energy. Contrary 
to intuition, the energy transition does not act to loosen energopower, 
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but fastens it, path-dependently reproducing the problematics of the 
fossil era. The infopower enacted by cost-benefit analysis makes it pos-
sible to disregard a number of otherwise relevant aspects in the analy-
sis of Viking Link. 
Djørup (2020, 5) confirms this link between infopower of calculative 
devices and energopower in relation to the treatment sectoral integra-
tion via district heating as an alternative to interconnection as dis-
cussed in section 2.4.: the Danish heat supply act requires “socioeco-
nomic viability” of district heating projects and this viability must be 
demonstrated using current Danish CBA guidelines: “In practice … 
fossil fuel companies … can choose to bring a case to EBA [The Danish 
Energy Board of Appeal, Energiklagenævnet] if they see alternative 
methodological assumptions threatening their market shares.” 
(Djørup, 2020, 6). 
Due to correlation and seasonality (the simultaneous occurrence of 
renewable electricity production patterns across borders discussed in 
2.5.2), new interconnectors like Viking Link alone cannot solve the 
problem of continuous supply of electricity in 100% renewable systems 
(Thellufsen and Lund, 2017; Brown et al., 2018), but the CBA analysis 
does not help decision-makers by highlighting this problem, but rather 
obscures it. The real-existing construction of Viking Link will enable 
trade smoothing out price peaks and troughs, eroding the economic 
viability of domestic flexibility measures like sectoral integration. This 
has consequences for actor diversity: The flexibility that the intercon-
nector will provide could alternatively have been provided by a mul-
titude of heat pumps, electric boilers, electric cars and other aggregated 
flexibility devices. As a form of local ownership of flexibility, such an 
approach would help break up the energo-material structures of the 
fossil energy system and increase public acceptance (Moss et al., 2015; 
Hvelplund and Djørup, 2019).  
In the case of Viking Link, the infopower inherent to cost-benefit 
analysis contributes to the limiting of possible results and hence fastens 
a welfare-economic worldview of mainstream economics. The facts 
produced by the calculative device act to depoliticize decision-making, 
thereby fastening energopower as alternative energy system configu-
rations are disregarded with the aid of CBA. The question remains 
whether Viking Link is a case of defective use of CBA, or whether it 
displays the defectiveness of CBA per se. While the case certainly con-
tains elements of both, improving the CBA process (e.g. by making 
CBA calculations publicly available) would not remove the defective-
ness, although it would make it easier to show how infopower is ex-
erted. Because CBA makes it possible to disregard alternatives through 
the promotion of certain welfare-economic assumptions, the defective-
ness lies with CBA per se. 
Putting decisions regarding international interconnectors back into 
the political process, for example through revised regulation of 
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transmission system operators, could open up for different tools like 
multi-criteria analysis which could in turn reduce the infopower that 
calculative devices like CBA exert on the energy transition. The Viking 
Link CBA thus acts as a concrete example of why new economic think-
ing (Göpel, 2016; Hasberg, 2020, Ch. 3; Røpke, 2020) is a necessity for 
achieving a sustainability transition. 
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